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Abstract
This paper aimed  to investigate the FDI determinants in 27 transition countries 
within  the 2002 – 2018 period by employing system GMM analysis. One of the 
results of our research is that an uncertain political situation and civil liberties 
violations have a significant negative impact on foreign investors’ confidence. 
Generally, the erosion of democratic institutions acts as a deterrent to FDI inflows. 
Transition countries which experienced prolonged periods of central planning also 
recorded lower levels of FDI inflows. The results show that creating conditions for 
stimulating foreign investors through the improvement of institutional quality 
embodied in the control of corruption and voice and accountability impacted 
positively on FDI inflows. The interplays between overall institutional quality, 
voice and accountability, regulatory quality, government effectiveness and GDP 
growth are positive and significant.  Hence, macroeconomic development has an 
important impact on the marginal effect of institutional quality. Therefore, we 
* Received: 10-01-2021; accepted: 22-06-2021
1 The paper was written within the research programme of the Institute of Social Sciences for 
2021 supported by Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development of the 
Republic of Serbia.
2 Research Associate, Center for Economic Research, Institute of Social Sciences, Kraljice 
Natalije 45, 11000 Belgrade, Serbia. Scientific affiliation: international capital flows, cross-
border mergers and acquisitions, and quality of institutional setting. Phone: +381113616002. 
E-mail: jzvezdanovic@idn.org.rs.
3 Deputy Director for Research, Senior research fellow, Institute of Economics, Russian Academy 
of Sciences, Nakhimovskiy pr. 32, 117997 Moscow, Russian Federation. Scientific affiliation: 
problems of socio-economic and political development of Central-Eastern and South-Eastern 
Europe, the EU enlargement, functional and territorial organization of industry and agriculture 
and varieties of capitalist relations. Phone: +74997241541. E-mail: m.m.lobanov@yandex.ru.
4 Docent, Academy for National Security, Kraljice Ane bb, 11000 Belgrade, Serbia. Scientific 
affiliation: mergers and acquisitions, corporative management, corruption and institutional 
development. Phone: +381648495255. E-mail: zvezdanovicmilan@gmail.com.
Jelena Zvezdanović Lobanova et al. • Governance and civil and political rights as FDI... 
60 Zb. rad. Ekon. fak. Rij. • 2021 • vol. 39 • no. 1 • 59-86
concluded that the influence of governance on FDI inflows is conditional on the 
transition countries’ macroeconomic performance. Our findings also reveal that of 
the governance dimensions, control of corruption and voice and accountability 
have a significant influence on the decision of multinationals to undertake 
investment. 
Key words: foreign direct investment, institutions, civil society, democracy, 
transition countries
JEL classification: D73, E22, F21, F23, O52
1. Introduction
The issue of cross-border capital flows is one of the key areas in the study of foreign 
economic activity at the national and corporate levels. The territorial and sectoral 
structure transformation of cross-border investment flows, and their dynamics 
have enabled us to assess the international division of labour development in 
the modern globalizing world. Studies on international investment activity are 
highly controversial and leave open unanswered questions about the advantages 
and disadvantages of capital attraction, factors concerning the investment 
competitiveness of recipient countries, the effects of capital exports in home 
countries, and, finally, the essential reasons for the movement and accumulation of 
capital. The transition countries considered in this paper have only been actively 
involved in the global process of capital redistribution for a few decades, but their 
experience in participating in cross-border investment flows is very revealing and 
has been the subject of an extensive number of scientific studies. Of particular 
interest in this regard is the issue of institutional factors in attracting foreign direct 
investment (FDI), which are usually addressed less frequently than macroeconomic 
factors. 
Analysis of cross-border capital movements shows that FDI inflows in transition 
countries are linked to progress in the implementation of economic reforms. 
It is believed that some transition countries have attracted fewer capital flows 
than expected due to factors like the quality of the institutional environment, 
macroeconomic instability, differences in technology, high adjustment costs, etc. 
(Lipschitz et al., 2001). Some studies have proved that the improvement of the 
institutional framework together with the abolition of capital restrictions and the 
enhancement of economic growth influence patterns of international capital flows. 
The characteristics of institutional development in the host transition countries 
determine the investment decisions of transnational companies (TNCs) as regards 
entry mode strategy (Dikova and Witteloostuijn, 2007). 
Although, in general, openness to capital flows influenced economic modernization, 
in most industries the expected technology transfer did not happen. It was primarily 
because TNC subsidiaries only insignificantly integrated local firms into their 
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global and regional value chains. According to some studies, FDI does not generate 
positive intra-industry spillovers for domestic firms in transition countries (Damijan 
et al., 2003). Intersectoral and intrasectoral spillover effects affecting productivity 
and technology transfer have arisen in only a few transition countries, characterized 
by a developed institutional environment.
FDI inflows in these countries are often attracted by different types of incentives 
which play a role of compensation for an underdeveloped business environment 
and potential macroeconomic risks. These incentives are also often caused by 
mutual competition between countries of the region characterized by similar 
macroeconomic conditions. The incentives to foreign investors are usually various 
subsidies and tax breaks. In addition, the key drivers for FDI attraction in these 
countries are natural resources, the availability of cheap, unskilled or semi-skilled 
labour, adequate technological capacity, and management skills of the host country 
(Dunning and Lundan, 2008). 
This paper aims to provide a broader perspective on FDI determinants in transition 
countries. We analyze the influence of governance and democratic society variables 
on FDI inflows in 27 transition countries from 2002 to 2018 by using dynamic panel 
data approach.5 In addition, we examine the possibility of whether the marginal 
impact of various governance dimensions on FDI inflows is determined by the 
economic conditions in transition countries. We will not only assess the marginal 
effect of the overall Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGIs), but also examine 
the impact of six governance indicators on FDI inflows according to separate 
models. Based on the previous empirical findings, we build three hypotheses. The 
first hypothesis is as follows: respect for political rights and civil liberties bears 
testament to a movement towards democracy and could lead to an increase in FDI 
inflows into host transition countries. The second hypothesis is formulated as: an 
improvement in governance has positive and significant effect on FDI attraction 
in transition countries. Finally, we assume that the creation of conditions for 
stimulating foreign investors through the improvement of institutional quality 
combined with favourable macroeconomic development influence positively 
on FDI inflows. The results of this research will broaden our understanding 
of the interdependence of governance and democratic society institutions and 
macroeconomic development on FDI inflows in transition countries. 
5 Countries included in the sample: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Moldova, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Poland, Romania, the Russian Federation, 
Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. Taking into account the time period 
of the study (starting from 2002), we deliberately included in the sample those countries that became 
members of the European Union in 2004, 2007, and 2013, i.e. formally lost the status of countries 
with economies in transition. 
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This paper is structured as follows: first, we review the literature concerning the 
determinants of FDI inflows, the following  sections present our methodology, 
model specification and data, and the final one discusses the results.
2. Literature review
The second half of the 20th century marked the FDI’s steady growth in different 
political and socio-economic conditions.  It increased research activities focused 
on the investment decisions of companies. However, the fact remains that, despite 
the vast number of theoretical and empirical studies on FDI, they have not yielded 
a consensus. Empirical studies on FDI determinants are substantial, but there is no 
consensus on the role of factors influencing investors’ behaviour. Several recent 
studies have confirmed that low transaction and labour costs, the availability of 
natural resources, geographical position, market size, access to infrastructure, the 
degree of openness could influence decisions on the location of FDI (Demirhan 
and Masca, 2008; Chanegriha et al., 2017; Asongu et al., 2018). Most of them 
are within the well-known Dunning’s eclectic paradigm methodological frames 
(Dunning, 2000). However, some authors pinpoint that for multinational 
companies, efficiency-seeking factors such as the level of the minimum wage, 
the unemployment rate, or corporate income taxation in host countries, are not 
relevant factors (see Wach and Wojciechowski, 2016). They believe that increasing 
the degree of investor protection and labour productivity could attract additional 
levels of FDI.Shukurov (2016) used a panel of CIS countries and found that foreign 
investors are more sensitive to various factors such as market size, abundance in 
natural resources, FDI stock, fiscal imbalance and inflation. He indicates that these 
determinants influence the pattern of FDI inflows in transition countries regardless 
of the presence of high investment risk. On the other hand, Ezeoha and Cattaneo 
(2012) note that urban infrastructure, property rights policy, trade openness and 
institutional quality (rule of law) can significantly affect FDI, especially in non-
resource-rich countries, while Bobenič Hintošova et al. (2018) suggest the level 
of gross wages and the share of educated labour force have the greatest positive 
influence on foreign investor attraction. The latter paper also reveals that factors 
such as corporate income tax, trade openness and expenditure on research and 
development deter FDI inflows in Visegrad countries. 
In recent years, a growing number of authors have emphasized the importance 
of institutional setting as a determinant of FDI inflows (Fabry and Zeghni, 2010; 
Kazemi and Azman-Saini, 2017; Azis, 2018; Mahmood et al., 2019). For example, 
Bevan et al. (2004) examined the relationship between various dimensions of a 
newly-created institutional framework in East European transition economies 
and FDI inflows. They found that the quality of formal institutions (especially 
the private ownership of business, banking sector reform, foreign exchange, trade 
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liberalization, and legal developments) had encouraged FDI inflows in transition 
economies. FDI sensitivity to the institutional environment was also shown in a 
paper by Fabry and Zeghni (2006). The authors argue that foreign investors are 
more willing to invest in new EU members than in post-socialist countries which 
have become or are on the way to becoming candidates for EU membership. The 
institutional arrangement in countries which have already fulfilled the acquis 
communautaire requirements is characterized by greater stability and reliability, 
positively impacting on the level of inward FDI. Moreover, expectations of 
accession to the EU lead to large-scale financial inflows, in particular FDI. 
Researchers tend to differentiate between institutional factors for attracting FDI 
based on the level of socio-economic and political development of countries. For 
instance, Peres et al. (2018) provide evidence that the quality of institutions has a 
positive and significant impact on FDI in developed countries, while their influence 
in developing countries has not been identified. Similarly, Sabir et al. (2019) show 
that institutional setting has a more significant impact on FDI inflows in developed 
countries than in developing ones. The authors also reveal that factors such as GDP 
per capita, agriculture value-added and a high inflation rate tend to discourage 
foreign investors in developed countries. In the case of developing countries, the 
authors point out that GDP per capita, trade openness, agriculture value-added and 
infrastructure play an important role in attracting FDI inflows, while, by observing 
advanced economies, Dellis et al. (2017) also provide evidence that quality of 
economic structure and institutions are influential factors in this, too. They argue 
that foreign investors are not only interested in respect for basic rights (rule of law, 
property rights or regulatory efficiency), but also  the well-functioning of labour 
markets and product markets in host countries. The results mentioned above are in 
contrast to the findings of Jadhav (2012), who investigated the role of economic, 
institutional and political determinants of FDI in BRICS countries. He demonstrates 
that economic factors such as market size measured according to real GDP, trade 
openness and natural resource availability are more important to foreign investors 
than institutional and political factors. 
On the other hand, Lucke and Eicher (2016) point out that FDI is affected by 
improvements in institutional quality in developing and transitional economies 
more than in developed countries. They provide evidence that foreign investors 
are likely to invest in developed countries characterized by a higher level of 
corruption and a politically unstable system (compared to their home countries). 
Younsi and Bechtini (2019) found that political stability, government effectiveness 
and regulatory quality are the main drivers of FDI inflows in emerging host 
countries. Therefore, they stress the importance of sound economic policies and the 
implementation of regulations  to improve the investment climate. Lacroix et al. 
(2018) demonstrate that low political risk and democratic institutions are important 
for attracting FDI in developing countries. The authors emphasise that consolidated 
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democratic transitions defined as those that do not go into reverse for at least five 
years bring in a higher amount of FDI. 
These results contrary to the findings of Adam and Filippaios (2007). They 
demonstrate that multinational firms tend to invest in countries characterized by 
low civil liberties but high political rights. They stress that such a result can be 
explained by the various motives of foreign investors in different types of countries. 
A study by Asiedu and Lien (2011) reveals interesting results regarding the 
relationship between democracy and FDI inflows in a large number of developing 
countries. The authors demonstrate that democracy promotes FDI only if the share 
of mineral resources in total exports is lower than a certain critical value and they 
show that the expansion of democracy enhanced FDI in 90 countries while in the 
remaining countries it was a deterrent. 
The recent empirical study by Economou (2019) shows that economic freedom 
components such as protection of property rights, monetary and financial freedom, 
government integrity bear positive impact on FDI inflows in four South European 
economies. Paul and Jadhav (2020) argue that institutional setting measured by 
effective rule of law, political stability, regulatory quality and control on corruption 
has significant impact on FDI in emerging markets, as well as infrastructure quality 
and trade cost measured by tariff and non-tariff barriers. By investigating the effects 
of traditional, institutional and agglomeration determinants on choice of investment 
location on a sample of six countries of the Western Balkans, Kurtovic et al. (2020) 
highlight that traditional (GDP per capita and GDP growth rate), agglomeration 
(urbanisation rate, foreign agglomerations in the service sector and the number 
of employees in the service sector) and institutional determinants (government 
spending) have a positive impact on the choice of FDI location. 
3. Research methodology
To assess the  FDI determinants, a number of researchers apply the dynamic 
panel data analysis, primarily because of providing an overview of the spatial 
and temporal dimensions for all units in the sample. System GMM estimator 
allows us to model the dynamic aspects of the FDI inflows and take into account 
the endogenous nature of explanatory variables included in our analysis. This 
estimator is suitable for panel data analysis characterized by small T and large 
N and for models with endogenous and predetermined explanatory variables. It 
checks for the presence of unobserved country-specific effects, as well as for a 
simultaneity bias caused by the potential endogeneity of the explanatory variables. 
Thanks to dynamic panel data analysis, we were able to investigate the dynamics 
of adjustment by including a lagged endogenous variable among the exogenous 
variables and to address the problems of potential endogeneity, autocorrelation and 
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heteroscedasticity in our models. Namely, the system GMM estimator enabled us to 
see the effects of lagged FDI on the current inflows.
System GMM involves combining moment conditions for the model in first 
differences with moment conditions for the model in levels (Bun and Windmeijer, 
2010). This estimator has an advantage over Difference GMM in cases when random-
walk variables (or those close to being random-walk variables) and time-invariant 
variables (such as the number of years under central planning in our case) are included 
in the analysis. In addition, as highlighted by Roodman (2009), this estimator can 
significantly improve efficiency and concurrently allows for more instruments. 
It was used to overcome the shortcomings of its difference-based GMM 
counterparts, which occur in cases when the series are highly persistent (Blundell 
and Bond, 1998). This estimator is commonly used in studies that investigate the 
importance of institutional quality, whose variables are characterized by long-term 
persistence. In such circumstances, the system GMM estimator helps us to reduce 
biased parameter estimates and the imprecision associated with other methods 
(Blundell et al. 2000). 
Following Kucera and Principi (2017) Lucke and Eichler (2016), Sabir et al. (2019), 
we used a dynamic system Generalized Method of Moment (GMM) estimator on a 
panel data set compiled from annual observations of 27 transition countries. This 









where the subscript i denotes the ith country (i = 1…27) and the subscript t denotes 
the tth year (t = 1…17), while β0 to β6 are regression coefficients and εit are the error 
terms. FDI is FDI inflows as a percentage of GDP, FDIit-1 is the lagged dependent 
variable, GDPG is GDP growth as a measure of macroeconomic development, 
OPEN is Trade as a percentage of GDP as a measure of trade restriction, GFCF is 
gross fixed capital formation as a percentage of GDP as a measure of infrastructure 
development, INF is the average consumer price (percentage change) as a measure 
of macroeconomic stability, and DEMOCRACY is a vector of determinants like:
– political rights (POLRIGHTS);
– civil liberties (CIVLIBERTIES), and
– a dummy variable for STATUS. 
The impact of governance indicators and their interplay with macroeconomic 
development was also investigated with the following panel model specifications:
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where INSit stands for the overall institutional quality index (denoted as 
OWGI), obtained by the Principal Component Analysis Method – PCA, as 
well as governance indicators, which were included separately in order to avoid 
multicollinearity. 
PCA is used for dimension reduction within a large dataset and saving computation. 
Its advantage is  that it keeps as much variation as possible and retains most of 
the information while  enabling it to avoid multicollinearity. This mathematical 
technique summarizes the six governance indicators (Voice and Accountability 
(VA), Political Stability and Absence of Violence (PSAV), Government 
Effectiveness (GE), Regulatory Quality (RQ), Rule of Law (RL), and Control of 
Corruption (CC)) into one factor (OWGI). The value of each indicator ranges from 
-2.5 to 2.5, with higher values indicating a better quality of the institutional setting. 
The first principal component derived from these indicators can explain about 87% 
of the variations in the original six governance indicators. In addition, according 
to the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy (0.90), the data 
is suitable for PCA. Therefore, we were able to use the first PCA component as 
an indicator for an assessment of the impact of institutional quality in transition 
countries and thus eliminate problems, which could occur due to omitted variable 
bias. 
In model specification (2), we examined which aspects of institutional quality 
have contributed most to FDI inflows, while in specification (3) we assessed the 
combined effect on FDI inflows by employing the interaction terms between GDP 
growth and various governance dimensions. In our study, the lagged dependent 
variable, GDP growth and GFCF were treated as endogenous variables in each 
of our regressions. We also used lags 2 to 4 of endogenous variables in order to 
alleviate the instrument proliferation problem. The collapse option was also used 
to reduce the size of the instruments matrix. We performed the ‘Windmeijer 
correction’ (Windmeijer, 2005) using Stata’s ‘small’ command (Roodman, 2009) 
to obtain corrected standard errors. We employed the Hansen test to analyse the 
appropriateness of the model specification and the validity of over-identifying 
restrictions. According to Roodman (2009), problems which occur due to 
instrument proliferations are overfitting of endogenous variables and failure to 
expunge their endogenous components. We are guided by the rule that the number 
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of instruments should not exceed the number of groups in order to maintain the 
validity of the Hansen over-identification test to reduce bias. Moreover, Roodman 
(2009) suggested that the Hansen p-value should have a higher value than the 0.1, 
at least 0.25 levels. In addition, we also tested for second-order serial correlations 
AR (2) of the differenced residuals. Having in mind that lagged values are used 
as instruments, unbiased estimation requires the absence of second-order serial 
correlation in the error term (Arellano and Bond, 1991). To test this requirement, 
we perform the Arellano-Bond AR (2) test. A p-value of greater than 0.05 implies 
the absence of second-order autocorrelation. All the estimations were performed 
using the xtabond2 program written by Roodman (2009).  
4. Empirical data and analysis
The choice of the time period and the set of transition countries were dependent on 
data availability. In our research, we tried to include variables that prove to have 
significant influence on FDI inflows. Some of the macroeconomic variables used in 
other studies were found insignificant in our calculations. A list of all the variables 
included in our dynamic panel data analysis is presented in Appendix. Data for our 
dependent variable FDI inflows as a percentage of GDP were taken from the World 
Bank World Development Indicators online database. The same source was used for 
GDP growth, Trade openness and GFCF. Data on Worldwide governance indicators 
were obtained from the World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators project 
database and data on inflation (average consumer prices, percentage change) – from 
the World Economic Outlook database developed by the International Monetary 
Fund. 
As far as the concept of institutional quality is concerned, we adhere to the 
description proposed by the experts of the World Bank. According to them, 
institutional quality is positively associated with balances in the political system 
and civil rights, as well as with the commitment to policy measures of openness 
(Islam and Montenegro, 2002). We used civil and political rights indicators by 
the Freedom House Foundation (Freedom in the World database), which rates all 
countries according to the development of their democratic institutions. Each of 
these two indices is given a value between 1 and 7, with 1 representing the highest 
degree of freedom or democratic rights and liberties and 7 the lowest. According 
to Freedom House, the political rights rating is constructed based on the status of 
the electoral process, political pluralism and participation, and the functioning of 
government. The civil liberties rating assesses the presence or lack of freedom 
of expression, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal 
autonomy and individual rights. Transition countries are likely to be less attractive 
to foreign investors if they exhibit a weakening of democratic norms. Therefore, the 
expected signs of coefficients are negative. 
Jelena Zvezdanović Lobanova et al. • Governance and civil and political rights as FDI... 
68 Zb. rad. Ekon. fak. Rij. • 2021 • vol. 39 • no. 1 • 59-86
We also added a dummy variable to evaluate the impact of the state of democracy 
(free, partly free, or not free) on the decision of potential foreign investors. For 
instance, the dummy variable STATUS is given the value 1 when denoting countries 
that are classified as partly free or not free, and 0 otherwise (free countries). 
Additionally, institutional development encompasses variables such as years under 
central planning and the EU membership dummy variable. It can be assumed that the 
achievements in transition countries are determined to some extent by how deeply 
rooted the formal and informal institutions linked to central economic planning 
are and the nature of prior economic development (the ‘path dependence’ effect 
hypothesis). 
The variable CENTRAL PLANNING represents the number of years under 
central planning and shows how long transition countries experienced direct state 
involvement in economic processes. We included the dummy variable NON-EU, 
which is given the value 1 if a country is not a member of the EU and 0 otherwise. 
For transition countries, the EU accession process represents one of the main systemic 
incentives for a fundamental transformation of the institutional setting. The EU played 
the role of external anchor, ensuring the implementation of market economy norms 
and the establishment of democratic institutions in these countries (Roland, 2004). It 
is widely believed that institutional transformation in European transition countries 
was closely linked to the process of EU accession. Since the level of institutional 
quality in the majority of transition countries is far below that advocated by the EU, 
we expected this coefficient to have a negative and significant impact on FDI inflows.
WGIs are developed by Kaufmann et al. (2010: 4), who defined governance as 
‘the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised’. These 
measurements are based on expert evaluations and surveys of households and 
businesses related to different areas of the institutional setup. They cover three 
significant aspects of institutional setting. Namely, one can identify the following 
groups of governance indicators:
– the first group of measures (VA and PSAV) assesses ‘the process by which 
governments are selected, monitored and replaced’;
– the second group of measures (GE and RL) captures ‘the capacity of the 
government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies’; 
– the third group of measures (CC and RQ) shows ‘the respect of citizens and 
the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among 
them’.
It should be noted that VA and PSAV primarily measure the strength of political 
institutions in contrast to the other WGIs. We believe that these two indicators are 
related to those aspects of the institutional setting covered by the Freedom House 
data (Civil rights, Political rights).
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According to the descriptive statistics in Table 1, the economic development 
indicators in the transition countries differ to a great extent. For example, the mean 
FDI as a percentage of GDP for the total sample is 5.76%, with a standard deviation 
of 7.49. We also found wide variations in openness to trade, gross fixed capital 
formation, the level of inflation and GDP growth. For instance, the trade openness 
variable was between 29.75 and 192.34% with an average of 102.92% and a standard 
deviation of 32.36. The mean values of the governance indicators ranged from -0.26 
to 0.16, while their medians ranged from 0.66 (for CC) to 0.89 (for VA). The RQ 
variable had the highest mean value (0.16) among the governance factors. 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
FDI 459 5.760 7.490 -46.769 55.075
GDPG 459 4.200 4.654 -14.814 34.466
OPEN 457 102.919 32.366 29.748 192.345
GFCF 457 23.889 5.681 6.3 57.71
INF 459 5.665 6.546 -1.601 59.218
POLRIGHTS 451 3.292 2.096 1 7
CIVLIBERTIES 451 3.066 1.736 1 7
STATUS 451 0.536 0.4992 0 1
CENTRAL PLANNING 459 55.370 12.707 41 74
NON-EU 459 0.673 0.469 0 1
OWGI 455 3.08e-09 2.293 -4.883 4.233
CC 459 -0.260 0.663 -1.415 1.506
VA 459 -0.021 0.895 -2.124 1.213
PSAV 455 0.028 0.719 -2.020 1.302
RL 459 -0.136 0.737 -1.476 1.372
RQ 456 0.166 0.772 -1.710 1.698
GE 456 0.004 0.671 -1.230 1.192
Source: Authors’ calculations
In Table 2, we have provided the correlation matrix for FDI and its determinants 
in order to assess whether there are significant associations between the analysed 
variables. When the correlation coefficient is greater than 0.6, the relationship 
between the variables is considered to be significant, which may call into question 
efficient and reliable parameter estimation and thus the validity of the model. 
The correlation coefficients between various governance dimensions, as well as 
indicators of democracy, have a value higher than 0.7, which might indicate the 
presence of multicollinearity. In order to avoid this problem, we decided to include 
them separately in our regressions. 
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According to the p-values of the Hansen test statistics reported in Table 3, we 
can conclude that the instruments are uncorrelated with errors. Therefore, our 
results show that the instruments are valid at conventional levels of statistical 
significance. The test statistic for second-order serial correlation also suggests that 
there is no second-order serial correlation in the first differences in the residuals 
in all specifications. In column 1 of Table 3, we have presented the results of our 
baseline model, while in columns 2-6, we have assessed the influence of democracy 
variables on FDI attraction. 
The coefficient of lagged FDI inflows is positive and significant at the 1% level 
in all the tables. Therefore, we found that the agglomeration effect has a positive 
influence on FDI inflows in transition countries. The value of this coefficient is 
below 1, which points to the existence of convergence. GDP growth has the sign 
we expected, but the coefficient is not significant in any of our regressions. It seems 
that this variable is not of decisive importance for FDI attraction in the selected 
countries. 
We found that trade openness does not contribute positively to an increase in FDI 
inflows. These coefficients are negative and significant at the 5% level. Trade 
openness does not contribute positively to an increase in FDI inflows. In some 
circumstances, trade openness can lead to the excessive dependence of economic 
growth on external market factors and, therefore, may trigger macroeconomic 
imbalances. Moreover, trade openness provides indirect evidence of the absence 
of foreign trade barriers, so it reduces the interest of potential investors in FDI: 
companies can expand into new markets through cross-border commodity deliveries 
without investing in the creation of production sites. On the other hand, investments 
in the development of different kinds of infrastructure (industrial, transport, and 
social) are among the important incentives for TNCs to invest abroad. 
The significant positive coefficients of GFCF show that investments in developing 
different kinds of infrastructure (industrial, transport, and social) are among the 
important incentives for TNCs to invest abroad, which is in line with the findings 
of Asiedu and Lien (2011). The coefficient of inflation in Table 3 exhibits a mixed 
pattern, but is not statistically significant in any of the models.
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Our findings reveal a negative and significant coefficient of political rights 
on FDI, meaning that countries with increasing concerns over political rights 
discourage foreign investors. We also found that less protection of fundamental 
basic rights also reduces investment inflows, while an uncertain political situation 
and violations of civil liberties weigh heavily on foreign investors’ confidence. 
The coefficient of central planning and the dummy variable Status are significant 
and have the expected signs. Countries classified as partly free or not free due to 
difficulties in establishing political rights and civil liberties are also less attractive 
to foreign investors. The coefficient of the Non-EU dummy variable is negative 
and significant, indicating that non-EU transition countries had fewer FDI inflows 
during the period under consideration. 
Based on the GMM diagnostics in Table 4, we note that the p-value of the Hansen 
test statistic is relatively high, suggesting instrument validity. We did not find 
evidence for the presence of second-order serial correlation in the first-difference 
residuals. In all our regressions, the lagged dependent variable has the correct sign 
and significance, which provides evidence for the dynamic nature of FDI inflows in 
transition countries. The estimated coefficients for current GDP growth are positive 
but not statistically significant in all the columns. Trade openness carries a negative 
sign and it is statistically significant at the conventional level of 0.05. 
The coefficients of control of corruption (CC) and voice and accountability (VA) are 
positive and statistically significant, while other governance indicators also turned 
out to be positive but insignificant. We can assume that these governance indicators 
are among the factors influencing the investment activities of multinationals in 
transition countries. Voice and accountability as a proxy for the level of pluralism in 
a country reveal the process of establishing, monitoring, and replacing government 
bodies. Therefore, we have provided evidence that an improvement in political and 
human rights ratings is important for foreign investors in transition countries. 
Table 5 presents results using the interaction terms between GDP growth and 
the quality of the institutional setting measured by both the overall and separate 
governance indicators. The large p-values of the Hansen test statistics are taken 
as evidence of the validity of the instrument subsets. The coefficients of the 
current GDP growth rate range from 0.127 to 0.173 according to these particular 
regressions, but they are not statistically significant at conventional levels. The 
coefficients of trade openness are negative and statistically significant in all our 
regressions, which means that higher trade openness discourages FDI inflows in 
transition countries. Gross fixed capital formation is positively and significantly 
associated with FDI inflows in all columns in this table. Inflation has the expected 
sign, but it continues to be insignificant in all regressions.
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The synergetic effects captured by the interactive terms are all positive but the 
only significant coefficient is between GDP growth and VA, RQ, GE, and overall 
WGI. In other words, the creation of conditions for stimulating foreign investors via 
the improvement of institutional quality combined with favourable macroeconomic 
development has reflected positively on FDI inflows. Based on the magnitude of 
the coefficients mentioned above, the interaction term with VA has the strongest 
influence on FDI inflows followed by RQ. Therefore, it can be assumed that foreign 
investors are not attracted by the quality of institutional setting alone, but they also 
take into account the effectiveness of economic development.
5. Results and discussion
Using system GMM, we have found out that the agglomeration effect has a 
positive influence on FDI inflows in transition countries. This means that FDI 
recipients manage to create a virtuous circle of attracting investment, which then 
greatly encourages the attraction of more foreign investment into these countries. 
Therefore, the agglomeration effect leads to the further differentiation of transition 
countries in terms of the tempo of FDI accumulation. Our results also show that 
investments in developing different kinds of infrastructure are among the important 
incentives for TNCs to invest abroad, which is in line with the findings of Asiedu 
and Lien (2011).
Contrary to the earlier findings by Younsi and Bechtini (2019), Ezeoha and Cattaneo 
(2012) and Jadhav (2012), who demonstrated that trade openness attracts more 
FDI inflows, our findings show that trade openness discourages foreign investors. 
It is noteworthy that our conclusion is in line with the results of some other studies 
such as Brun and Gnangnon (2017), Walsh and Yu (2010), and Bobenič Hintošova 
et al. (2018). The obtained results could be explained in two ways. Firstly, higher 
trade openness in some countries could prove a disincentive for foreign investors. 
Namely, in some circumstances trade openness can lead to the excessive dependence 
of economic growth on external market factors, and therefore, they may trigger 
macroeconomic imbalances. Secondly, trade openness is indirect evidence of the 
absence of foreign trade barriers, so it reduces the interest of potential investors in 
FDI: companies can expand into new markets through cross-border commodity 
deliveries without investing in the creation of production sites.
The following example can illustrate this assumption.The transition of the Visegrad 
group states to the EU common external tariffs applicable to third countries 
contributed to a decrease in the weighted average rate of import duty, but for 
some types of industrial products (including household electrical appliances and 
electronics) it increased. As a result, in the mid-2000s, Asian companies began 
to actively create production sites in the Visegrad group countries in order to 
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avoid paying customs duties (so-called ‘anti-dumping tariff jumping’) (see, for 
example, Ando and Kimura (2013)). In addition, it has been estimated that while 
the improvement of the terms of foreign trade (for example, by signing free trade 
agreements) has a positive effect on the volume of commodity flows, it often has a 
negative effect on capital inflows.
Our empirical findings indicate that insufficient attention to respect for political 
rights and civil liberties has a negative and significant effect on FDI inflows in 
transition countries. Multinational companies may be reluctant to invest in transition 
countries that have experienced a substantial deterioration in political rights. A 
democratic deficit and unfavourable environment for the promotion and respect of 
civil society values have harmed the willingness of foreign investors to take a risk 
in some of these countries. In conditions where the gap between the political elites 
and society is widening, which has culminated in the erosion of civil liberties in 
some transition countries, there is a justifiable fear that foreign investors’ rights, 
including those concerning intellectual property, will not be adequately protected. 
Our findings are consistent with the results of Adam and Filippaios (2007), Harms 
and Ursprung (2002), and Kucera and Principi (2017), who also shows that the 
development of democratic society institutions results in additional FDI inflows.
Moreover, we have found out that those transition countries that experienced longer 
periods of central planning also recorded a lower level of FDI inflows. It can be 
assumed that it is difficult for these countries to overcome the structural imbalances 
of the economy, rooted during the development of the planned economy, and 
thereby to improve the investment climate (a negative ‘lock-in’ effect). Countries 
classified as partly free or not free due to difficulties in securing political rights and 
civil liberties were also less attractive to foreign investors. Our findings provide 
evidence that those transition countries which did not become EU members 
received fewer FDI inflows than the others included in our analysis. Most probably 
these countries were less attractive to foreign investors since they did not have the 
stable institutional framework necessary for the functioning of a market economy. 
The implementation of economic reforms slowed down or was even suspended as 
a result of adverse economic, political and social developments in these countries. 
The existing institutional arrangements were serious impediments to the economic 
development of the post-socialist countries since they were not able to adapt 
successfully to the changing conditions.
We found that control of corruption and voice and accountability were the main 
drivers of FDI inflows in transition countries (among the governance indicators). 
We have shown that FDI inflows are positively and significantly affected by 
improvements in these areas of institutional quality. In those countries where public 
power is commonly used for private gains (the ‘state capture’ phenomenon), higher 
amounts of FDI are less probable. A similar result was obtained by Sabir et al. 
(2019), who also points out that FDI inflows in developing countries are positively 
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and significantly affected by control of corruption, government effectiveness and 
political stability. The concentration of power by a limited circle of representatives of 
the political elite in some countries is usually accompanied by corruption that limits 
business opportunities. In conditions of legal uncertainty, foreign investors are put at 
a disadvantage since local companies could be more familiar with non-transparent 
business procedures, weak judicial systems, complicated legal and regulatory 
frameworks, etc. Therefore, investors feel safe if their rights are protected and the 
operational rules are developed and enforced by independent institutions. 
Our conclusion that a higher level of democracy improves competitiveness for 
FDI attraction confirms the findings by Lucke and Eicher (2016), and Harms and 
Ursprung (2002). However, it contradicts the results of Mengistu and Adkihary 
(2012), who failed to provide evidence that voice and accountability and regulatory 
quality have a significant impact on FDI inflows in Asian economies. It is also 
inconsistent with the findings of Younsi and Bechtini (2019), which indicate that 
voice and accountability, rule of law and control of corruption are negatively and 
significantly linked to FDI inflows in emerging markets.
Our results indicate that the impact of the quality of institutions on FDI inflows 
is conditional on the macroeconomic performance of transition countries. We 
argue that GDP growth has a positive impact on the marginal effects of overall 
institutional quality as well as on voice and accountability, regulatory quality and 
government efficiency. The coefficient of the interaction term between the overall 
WGI and GDP growth is positive and significant. It means that macroeconomic 
development has a positive impact on the marginal effect of institutional quality. 
Therefore, the efforts made in areas such as the quality of public services, the 
transparency of economic regulation, and the promotion of the private sector 
play an important role in FDI attraction in transition countries. Foreign investors 
expect improvements in the legal framework, a rise in institutional capacity, and a 
reduction in administrative barriers. 
6. Conclusion
The primary aim of this study was to investigate the FDI determinants in 27 
transition countries within the 2002-2018 period by employing the system GMM 
analysis.The results confirmed the main hypothesis that respect for political 
rights and civil liberties could lead to an increase in FDI inflows into host 
transition countries. Among the governance indicators, corruption and voice 
and accountability were found to be the key drivers for FDI attraction. Our 
findings indicated that benefiting from an improved institutional environment 
requires favourable macroeconomic conditions. Specifically, we found that GDP 
growth affects FDI inflows positively and significantly in condition of improved 
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institutional quality, especially voice and accountability, regulatory quality and 
government efficiency. 
This paper contributes to the literature on determinants of FDI attraction in 
transition countries. In particular, we studied the joint impact of institutional quality 
and macroeconomic development. Our emphasis was on the institutional factors 
which may be crucial for all types of FDI. The decision made on independent 
variables was based on the previous research, and on existing theoretical knowledge 
on possible determinants of FDI inflows. We relied on the open data sources on the 
quality of the institutional setting that has been widely used in scholarly research. 
However, many of these indices are very subjective in many cases, because they 
reflect expert opinion on a few different areas of institutional quality. In addition, 
we acknowledge that we could not address the majority of factors that influence 
the foreign investment decisions. Therefore, we suppose that our empirical research 
could be extended and enriched by including factors related to different types of 
FDI. The attractive factors are, to a great extent, dependent on the motivation of 
the investor, i.e. different factors influence resource-seeking, efficiency-seeking, 
market-seeking and strategic asset-seeking FDI. 
Our findings have important implications for policymakers from countries in 
transition. Their major problem is not only providing a constitutional and legal 
framework for democracy and civil liberties but also securing the newly established 
economic and political freedoms that support competition. Fundamental rights are 
largely enshrined in the legislation of these countries, but it is necessary to ensure 
that they are fully implemented in practice. Democracy should not only be accepted 
formally, but there also has to be the protection of human rights and the creation of 
conditions for the development of political culture and a high degree of political 
participation. In order to increase the FDI attractiveness, institutional strengthening 
of transition countries is of key importance, which implies the introduction of 
democratic, legal, and economic institutions and improving administration and the 
judiciary so these institutions can function unhindered. In addition, policymakers 
are expected to make more effort to stimulate sustainable socio-economic 
development  to produce a positive and significant marginal effect of institutional 
quality on FDI inflows. Transition countries may ensure higher FDI inflows and 
faster economic development by increasing the quality of institutional arrangements 
to catch up with developed countries.
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Upravljanje i građanska i politička prava kao odrednice inozemnih izravnih 
ulaganja u tranzicijskim zemljama1
Jelena Zvezdanović Lobanova2, Mikhail Lobanov3, Milan Zvezdanović4
Sažetak
Cilj ovog rada bio je istraživanje odrednica izravnih stranih ulaganja u 27 
tranzicijskih zemalja u razdoblju od 2002. do 2018. godine, uz pomoć sistemskog 
GMM procjenitelja. Otkrili smo da neizvjesna politička situacija i kršenje 
građanskih sloboda imaju značajan negativan utjecaj na povjerenje stranih 
ulagača. Općenito, erozija demokratskih institucija odvraća priljev izravnih 
stranih ulaganja. Zemlje u tranziciji koje su imale duža razdoblja centralnog 
planiranja također su zabilježile niže nivoe priljeva SDI. Rezultati pokazuju da je 
stvaranje uvjeta za privlačenje stranih ulagača, uz pomoć poboljšanja 
institucionalne kvalitete u vidu kontrole korupcije i glasa i odgovornosti, pozitivno 
utjecalo na priljev SDI. Međudjelovanje ukupne institucionalne kvalitete, glasa i 
odgovornosti, regulatorne kvalitete, učinkovitosti Vlade i rasta BDP-a su pozitivna 
i značajna; prema tome, makroekonomski razvoj ima značajan utjecaj na granični 
učinak institucionalne kvalitete. Stoga smo zaključili da utjecaj upravljanja na 
priljev SDI ovisi o makroekonomskim performansama tranzicijskih zemalja. Naši 
rezultati također otkrivaju da, među upravljačkim dimenzijama, kontrola korupcije 
i glas i odgovornost imaju značajan utjecaj na odluke multinacionalnih kompanija 
o poduzimanju investicija.
Ključne riječi: izravna strana ulaganja, institucije, građansko društvo, demokracija, 
tranzicijske zemlje
JEL klasifikacija: D73, E22, F21, F23, O52
1 Rad je napisan u sklopu istraživačkog programa Instituta društvenih znanosti za 2021. godinu 
koji podržava Ministarstvo prosvjete, znanosti i tehnološkog razvoja Republike Srbije.
2 Znanstveni suradnik, Centar za ekonomska istraživanja, Institut društvenih znanosti, 
Kraljice Natalije 45, 11000 Beograd, Srbija. Znanstveni interes: međunarodni tokovi 
kapitala, prekogranična spajanja i preuzimanja, kvalitet institucionalnog okruženja. Tel.: 
+381113616002. E-mail: jzvezdanovic@idn.org.rs.
3 Zamjenik ravnatelja za istraživanje, Viši znanstveni suradnik, Ekonomski institut, Ruska 
akademija znanosti, Nakhimovskiy pr. 32, 117997 Moskva, Ruska Federacija. Znanstveni 
interes: problem socijalno-ekonomskog i političkog razvoja srednje, istočne i jugoistočne 
Europe, proširenje Europske unije, funkcionalna i teritorijalna organizacija industrije i 
poljoprivrede i varijeteti kapitalističnih odnosa. Tel.: +74997241541. E-mail: m.m.lobanov@
yandex.ru.
4 Docent, Akademija za nacionalnu sigurnost, Kraljice Ane bb, 11000 Beograd, Srbija. Znanstveni 
interes: spajanja i preuzimanja, korporativni menadžment, korupcija i institucionalni razvoj. 
Tel.: +381648495255. E-mail: zvezdanovicmilan@gmail.com. 
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Appendix: A list of the variables included in the analysis
Variables Definition Source
Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) FDI inflows as a percentage of GDP
World Bank World 
Development Indicators
GDP growth
(GDPG) Annual percentage growth rate of GDP 
World Bank World 
Development Indicators
Trade Openness 
(OPEN) Trade as percentage of GDP 
World Bank World 
Development Indicators
Gross fixed capital 
formation (GFCF)
Gross fixed capital formation as percentage 
of GDP 
World Bank World 
Development Indicators
Inflation
(INF) Average consumer prices, percentage change
World Economic Outlook 





The civil liberties’ rating includes four 
subcategories: Freedom of Expression and 
Belief, Associational and Organizational 
Rights, Rule of Law, and Personal Autonomy 
and Individual Rights. It ranges from 1 to 
7, with 1 representing the highest degree of 
freedom or democratic rights and liberties and 
7 the lowest.




The political rights’ rating includes three 
subcategories: Electoral Process, Political 
Pluralism and Participation, and Functioning 
of Government. It ranges from 1 to 7, with 1 
representing the highest degree of freedom 
or democratic rights and liberties and 7 the 
lowest.
Freedom in the World 
database
STATUS
The dummy variable STATUS is given the 
value 1 when denoting countries which are 
classified as partly free or not free, and 0 
otherwise (free countries).
Author’s calculations 
based on the data of  
Freedom in the World 
database
CENTRAL 
PLANNING The number of years under central planning
NON-EU
The dummy variable NON-EU is given the 
value 1 if a country is not a member of the EU 
and 0 otherwise.
INS
The variable INS is defined differently in each 
model. It relates to overall institutional quality 
index and separate governance indicators. All 
estimates of these indicators range from -2.5 
to 2.5 (the higher the number, the higher the 
quality of institutions).
Author’s calculations 
based on the data of 






A composite governance indicator which is 
constructed by the PCA of the governance 
indicators. 
Author’s calculations 
based on the data of 
World Bank Worldwide 
Governance Indicators 
project database
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Variables Definition Source
Control of Corruption 
(CC)
This variable captures the perceptions of the 
extent to which public power is exercised for 
private gain, including both petty and grand 
forms of corruption, as well as “capture” of 
the state by elites and private interests.
World Bank Worldwide 
Governance Indicators 
project database
Rule of Law (RL)
This variable captures the perceptions of the 
extent to which agents have confidence in and 
abide by the rules of society, and in particular 
the quality of contract enforcement, property 
rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the 
likelihood of crime and violence.





This variable captures the perceptions of the 
ability of the government to formulate and 
implement sound policies and regulations 
that permit and promote private sector 
development.
World Bank Worldwide 
Governance Indicators 
project database
Political Stability and 
Absence of Violence 
(PSAV)
This variable captures the perceptions of 
the likelihood that the government will be 
destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional 
or violent means, including politically‐
motivated violence and terrorism.






This variable captures the perceptions of the 
extent to which a country’s citizens are able 
to participate in selecting their government, 
as well as freedom of expression, freedom of 
association, and a free media.





This variable captures the perceptions of 
the quality of public services, the quality 
of the civil service and the degree of its 
independence from political pressures, 
the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of the 
government’s commitment to such policies.
World Bank Worldwide 
Governance Indicators 
project database
